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Abstract. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)  monitor a net- 
work with the aim  of discerning malicious  from benign activity  on that 
network.  While  a wide  range  of approaches  have  met  varying  levels of 
success, most IDS’s rely on having access to a database of known attack 
signatures which are written by security experts. Nowadays, in order  to 
solve problems  with false positive alerts, correlation algorithms are used 
to add  additional structure to sequences  of IDS  alerts. However,  such 
techniques  are  of no  help  in  discovering  novel  attacks  or  variations  of 
known  attacks,  something  the human  immune  system  (HIS)  is capable  
of doing in its own specialised  domain. This  paper  presents a novel im- 
mune  algorithm  for application  to an  intrusion  detection  problem. The 
goal is to discover packets containing novel variations of attacks covered 
by an existing signature base. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Network  intrusion  detection  systems  (NIDS)  are usually  based  on a fairly low 
level model  of network traffic. While  this is good for performance  it tends to 
produce  results  which make sense on a similarly  low level which means  that a 
fairly  sophisticated knowledge  of both networking technology and  infiltration 
techniques is required  to understand them. 
Intrusion alert correlation systems attempt to solve this problem  by  post- 
processing the alert stream from one or many  intrusion detection sensors (per- 
haps  even  heterogeneous  ones).  The  aim  is  to augment  the somewhat  
one- dimensional  alert stream with additional structure. Such structural 
information clusters alerts in to “scenarios”  - sequences of low level alerts 
corresponding  to a single logical threat. 
A common  model  for intrusion alert correlation algorithms is that of the 
attack graph.  Attack graphs  are directed acyclic graphs  (DAGs)  that represent 
the  various  types of alerts in  terms of their  prerequisites and  consequences. 
Typically  an  attack graph  is created  by  an  expert  from  a  priori  information 
 
 
 
 
about attacks. The attack graph enables a correlation component to link a given 
alert with a previous  alert by tracking back  to find alerts whose consequences 
imply the current alerts prerequisites. Another feature is that if the correlation 
algorithm is run in reverse, predictions of future attacks can be obtained. 
In  implementing  basic  correlation algorithms using  attack graphs,  it  was 
discovered that the output could be poor when the underlying IDS produced false 
negative alerts. This could cause scenarios to be split apart as evidence suggestive 
of a link between two scenarios is missing. This  problem  has been addressed  in 
various  systems  [8, 6] by adding  the ability  to hypothesise the existence  of the 
missing alerts in certain cases. [7] go as far as to use out  of band  data from a 
raw audit log of network traffic to help confirm or deny such hypotheses. 
While the meaning  of correlated alerts and predicted alerts is clear, hypoth- 
esised results are  less easy to interpret. Presence  of hypothesised alerts could 
mean more than just losing an alert, it could mean either of: 
 
1.  The  IDS missed the alert due to some noise, packet loss, or other low level 
sensor problem 
2.  The  IDS missed the alert because  a novel variation of a known attack was 
used 
3.  The IDS missed the alert, because something not covered by the attack graph 
happened  (totally new exploit, or new combination of known exploits) 
 
This work is motivated specifically by the problem of finding novel variations 
of attacks. The  basic  approach   is to apply  AIS  techniques to detect packets 
which contain such variations. A correlation algorithm is taken advantage of to 
provide additional safe/dangerous context signals to the AIS which would enable 
it to decide which packets to examine.  The  work aims to integrate a novel AIS 
component  with  existing  intrusion  detection  and  alert  correlation  systems  in 
order to gain additional detection capability. 
 
 
2 Background 
 
2.1 Intrusion Alert  Correlation 
 
Although the exact implementation details of attack graphs algorithms vary, the 
basic correlation algorithm takes an alert and an output graph, and modifies the 
graph by addition of vertices and/or edges to produce an updated output graph 
reflecting the current state of the monitored network system. 
For  the purposes  of discussion,  an  idealised  form  of correlation output is 
defined  which  hides  specific details of the correlation algorithm from the AIS 
component. This model, while fairly simple, adequately maps to current state of 
the art correlation algorithms. 
Firstly, as in [8], exploits are viewed as a 3-tuple (vuln, src, dst) where vuln 
is the identity of a know exploit and src and dst refer to two hosts which must 
be connected for the exploit to be carried out accross the network. An injective 
function  “f ” (ALERT  → EX P LOI T ). This  is because  there  may  be several 
 
 
 
 
variations of a single exploit, each requiring  a different signature from the un- 
derlying  IDS and consequently producing  distinct alerts. Parenthetically, many 
IDS  signatures contain within them meta-data such  as the Bugtraq or Mitre 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures  (CVE)  identification numbers  which al- 
lows this function to be implemented automatically. 
With our assumptions stated we may proceed to define our correlation graph. 
The output graph,  G, is defined as a DAG with exploit vertices (Ve ), condition 
vertices (Vc ) and edges (E): 
G = Ve  ∪ Vc  ∪ E 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example output graph  (conditions are boxes and exploits are ellipses). 
 
 
 
The two types of vertex are necessary  for being able to represent both con- 
junctive and disjunctive relations between exploits. As we can imagine by looking 
at Figure  1, any  number  of exploits may  lead to condition 3, namely  compro- 
mise of root privileges. This would mean that either the “AMSLVerify” exploit or 
some other root exploit may precede “Mstream Zombie Download.”  In another 
situation we may want “AMSLVerify”  and some other exploit to be the precon- 
dition.  In this  case we would simply  introduce  another  pre-requisite  condition 
for that exploit alongside condition 3. 
Each  disconnected  subgraph is considered  as a threat scenario.  That is to 
say, a structured set of low level alerts which constitute a single logical attack 
sequence. 
There  is a function “vertexstate” (V ERT EX  → V ERT EX ST AT E) which 
returns a 3 valued  type,  {H Y P, REAL, P RED} for hypothesised, real or pre- 
 
 
 
 
dicted  respectively.  Condition  vertices  have  a  function  “val”  (V ERT EX   → 
BOOL)  which tells us the value of the condition. 
In addition to this, exploit vertices contain information about the computer 
systems involved. Functions for retrieving source and destination addresses  and 
ports are  also  provided.  For  the purposes  of discussion  we will assume  that 
monitored networks are using the familiar TCP/IP protocol suite. Consequently 
we shall refer to these functions as “src”, “dst”, “srcport” and “dstport.” 
 
 
2.2 Danger Theory 
 
Over the last decade the focus of research  in immunology  has shifted from the 
adaptive to innate immune system, and the cells of innate immunity has moved 
to the fore in  understanding the behaviour  of immune  system as  a  whole[2]. 
Insights gained from this research are beginning to be appreciated and modelled 
at various levels by researchers  building  artificial immune systems. 
The algorithm described in Section 3 incorporates at a conceptual level mech- 
anisms from both the innate and adaptive immune system although, because of 
the change  in problem  domain,  these are implemented differently. This  section 
briefly reviews the biological processes and mechanisms  which have been drawn 
upon when designing the algorithm presented in this paper. 
The  biological  immune  system as  a  whole  provides  effective host defense 
through the complex interaction of various immune system cells with themselves 
and  their  environment, the tissue  of the host  organism.  Dendritic  cells (DCs), 
part of the innate immune system, interact with antigen derived  from the host 
tissue and control the state of adaptive immune system cells. 
Antigen is ingested from the extracellular milieu by DCs in their immature 
state and then processed internally. During processing, antigen is segmented and 
attached to ma jor  histocompatibility  complex  (MHC)  molecules.  This  MHC- 
antigen complex is then presented under certain conditions on the surface of the 
DC. As well as extracting antigen from their surroundings, DCs also have recep- 
tors which respond  to a range of other signalling molecules in their milieu. Cer- 
tain molecules, such a lipopolysaccaride, collectively termed pathogen-associated 
molecular  proteins (PAMPs[3]) are common  to entire classes of pathogens and 
bind with toll-like receptors (TLRs)  on the surface of DCs. 
Other groups of molecules, termed danger signals, such as heat shock proteins 
(HSPs),  are associated with damage  to host tissue or unregulated, necrotic cell 
death and  bind  with receptors on DCs.  Other classes of molecules  related to 
inflammation and  regulated, apoptotic cell death also  interact with receptor 
families present on the surface of DCs. The current maturation state of the DC 
is determined  through  the combination  of these  complex  signalling  networks. 
DCs  themselves secrete cell-to-cell signalling  molecules called  cytokines which 
control the state of other cell types. The  number  and  strength of DC cytokine 
output depends  on its current maturation state. 
T-cells, members of the adaptive immune system, have receptors which bind 
to antigen presented in an MHC-antigen complex on the surface of DCs and re- 
spond to the strength of the match between receptor and antigen. This response 
 
 
 
 
is usually  a change  in the differentiation state of the T-cell.  However,  this re- 
sponse is not solely determined by antigen, but also by the levels of cytokines 
sensed by a range of cytokine receptors present on the surface of T-cells. These 
receptors are specific for cytokines produced  by DCs. 
In summary,  DCs uptake  and  present  antigen  from the environment  to T- 
cells. Also, DCs uptake signals from the environment and produce signals which 
are received by T-cells. The ultimate response of a T-cell to an antigen is deter- 
mined by both the antigen presented by the DC and the signals produced  by the 
DC. Section 3 below describes the implementation of this model in the context 
of a computer intrusion detection problem. 
 
 
3 The Algorithm 
 
For  this  purpose  the “libtissue”  [9, 10] AIS framework,  a product  of a danger 
theory  pro ject  [1], will model a number  of innate  immune  system  components 
such  as  dendritic cells in  order  to direct an  adaptive T-cell  based  response. 
Dendritic cells will carry  the responsibility of discerning  dangerous  and  safe 
contexts as well as carrying out their role of presenting antigen and signals to a 
population of T-cells as in [4]. 
 
 
Tissue and Dendritic Cells Dendritic cells (henceforth DCs) are of a class of 
cells in the immune system known as antigen presenting cells. They  differ from 
other cells in this class in that this is their sole discernible  function. As well as 
being able to absorb  and  present antigenic material DCs are also well adapted 
to detecting a set of endogenous and exogenous signals which arise in the tissue 
(IDS correlation graph). 
These  biological  signals  are  abstracted in  our  system under  the following 
designations: 
 
1.  Safe: Indicates a safe context for developing toleration. 
2.  Danger: Indicates a change in behaviour  that could be considered patholog- 
ical. 
3.  Pathogen Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP)[3]: Known to be dangerous. 
In our system a distinction is made between activation by endogenous danger 
signals or through TLR  receptors. 
 
All of these environmental circumstances, or inputs, are  factors in the life 
cycle of the DC. In the proposed system, DCs are seen as living among the IDS 
environment. This is achieved by wiring up their environmental inputs to changes 
in the IDS output state. A population of DCs are tied to the prediction vertices 
in the correlation graph, one DC for each predicted attack. Packets matching the 
prediction criteria of such a vertex are collected as antigen by the corresponding 
DC. These  packets are either stored in memory  or logged to disk until the DC 
matures and is required  to present the antigen to a T-cell. 
Once a prediction vertex has been added to the correlation graph, the arrival 
of subsequent alerts can cause that vertex  to either  be upgraded  to an exploit 
 
 
 
 
vertex, changed to a hypothesised vertex, or become redundant as sibling vertices 
are so modified. These possible state changes will result in either a PAMP,  danger 
or safe signal respectively. 
These  signals initiate maturation and  consequent migration of the DC to a 
virtual lymph  node where they are exposed to a population of T-cells. 
The signal we are most interested in is the PAMP  signal, this occurs when a 
predicted vertex becomes hypothesised. This  provides  us with a counterfactual 
hypothesis  to test, ie. “suppose  a  novel a  variation  of the attack  was carried 
out.” The hypothesis is not unreasonable since: 
 
1.  The exploit was predicted already  therefore it’s prerequisites are met. 
2.  An exploit which depends on the consequences of the attack was carried out 
therefore the consequences of the exploit are met. 
 
However this is not enough for a proof, since the standard caveats about the 
accuracy of the model hold. An attacker may, after all, attempt an attack whose 
preconditions are not met, the attack will fail, but the IDS cannot know. 
 
 
Antigen Representation  An important part of the design of an AIS is the 
representation  of the domain  data. A number  of choices are  available  [12, 13]. 
For this algorithm we chose to use a natural encoding for the problem  domain. 
Network packets are blobs of binary data, each one is decoded by the IDS. The 
decoding  process  involves  extracting, interpreting and  validating the relevant 
features for the purpose  of matching the packet against the signature database. 
Our  proposed  algorithm represents each packet as an array  of (feature,val) 
tuples. The  array  contains a  tuple for all possible  features and  is ordered  by 
feature. Features can be either integers or character strings. Values may be set 
to wildcards  if the corresponding  feature is not present in the packet. 
This  approach  imposes a total order on the features. Such an order may be 
based, for example, on position in the packet which in nearly all cases is invariant 
and defined in protocol specifications. 
Note that this representation shares  structural similarities with the actual 
signatures used in network IDS’s. The connection is elaborated in the following 
sub-section. 
 
 
T-cells By the time a DC in our system has received a PAMP  signal, matured, 
migrated to a lymph node and bound  to a T-cell it contains a number  of candi- 
date packets (our  antigen) and  an indication of which signal caused migration. 
The simple T-cell model outlined in this paper only incorporates DC’s activated 
by PAMPs. 
The problem here is to select a subset of packets which may contain the novel 
variation(s) we are looking for. The inverse of the “f ” function in our correlation 
algorithm provides  a number  of candidate signatures which may  be used as a 
starting point. Thus  the additional context is used  to significantly reduce  the 
search space in this phase of the algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
In  order  to find  these possible  variations, a  version  of the IDS  signature 
matching  algorithm is  required  which  provides  meaningful  partial matching. 
Since most signatures entail string searching or regular expression matching this 
is not a trivial task. For now, it will suffice to simply sum the number  of match- 
ing criteria in each signature for each packet. If a match is sufficiently close, all 
the relevant data is output for further analysis.  Since most signatures have less 
than 10 criteria, this may  not be effective in all cases, due  to the anticipated 
difficulty in selecting good matching thresholds. 
 
 
4 Experimental  Results 
 
In order  to test the algorithm it is important to know how greatly the set of 
candidate packets for novel  attack variations can  be  reduced.  We  perform  a 
simple experiment to validate the algorithm in this way. We chose to prototype 
the algorithm  inside  Firestorm[14],  a  signature  matching  IDS  which  uses  the 
de-facto standard snort[15] signatures. 
A circa 2000 wu-ftpd[11] exploit called “autowux” is to be our novel variation 
on the snort “FTP EXPLOIT format string” signature (figure 2). These exploits 
share  the same attack methodology, namely  exploiting  format  string  overflows 
in the File Transfer  Protocol (FTP) “SITE  EXEC”  command. 
 
 
alert  tcp  $EXTERNAL  NET  any  ->  $HOME  NET  21  (msg:‘‘FTP  EXPLOIT  format 
string’’;  flow:to  server,established;  content:  ‘‘SITE  EXEC  |25  30  32  30 
64  7C  25  2E 66  25  2E 66  7C  0A|’’;  depth:  32;  nocase;) 
 
Fig. 2.  Generic  snort  signature  for  FTP format  string  exploits 
 
 
The  IDS is loaded with a full signature set and  is tested to make sure that 
the autowux exploit packets are not already  detected. A contrived attack graph 
with  3 exploits is also created (see figure 3). An nmap  scan is the prerequisite 
and vulnerability to rootkit installation is the consequence of our “novel” FTP 
exploit. 
The attack scenario is successfully played out across an otherwise quiet test 
network (run  #1). The  attack contains on the order  of three thousand packets 
and  the problem  should  be fairly simple because in the absence of background 
noise a high proportion of the packets are part of the FTP attack (975 of them 
to be precise).  To make  things  more realistic,  a second run  of the experiment 
is carried out in which there is background FTP traffic to our vulnerable  host. 
The background traffic is from the Lincoln Labs FTP data-set[16]. 
The  two  data sets  were merged  based  on time  deltas  between  packets,  the 
start packets are synchronised.  This  provides  a realistic and  repeatable mix of 
benign and attack traffic (run #2). 
The table below gives initial results for the prototype implementation based 
on a number  of uncontrolled experiments. Total packets is the total number  of 
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Contrived attack graph  used for experimental purposes 
 
 
 
 
packets in the merged data set, Ag packets refers to candidate packets in the DC 
and output packets refers to the final results - ie. those packets in which there is 
a suspected novel variation of an attack. False positive (FP) and false negative 
(FN)  rates are calculated through manual  analysis  of the output. In this case, 
there is one true positive in each data set so all candidate output packets that 
are not true positives are false positives, so the rate is calculated with  n−1 . 
 
Run  #1  is performed  on a quiescent  network,  run  #2  is with  background 
traffic as described  above. 
 
 
 
Run Total Packets Ag Packets Output Packets FP  Rate FN Rate 
#1 3,000 975 18 94% 0% 
#2 18,000 8,000 30 96% 0% 
Table 1. Accuracy of Algorithm with and without Background Traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
The  table shows that the packets of interest are extracted (eg. 975 / 3000) 
and  that after  further  processing  this  is reduced  to a mere handful  of packets 
(eg. 18). Overall the detection rate is good, despite the high false positive rates 
(eg. 94%) which are inherent in the problem. 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions and  Future Work 
 
In summation, a novel intrusion detection algorithm was presented drawing  on 
theoretical models of innate immunity. The algorithm incorporates within it ex- 
isting IDS algorithms, but expands on their capability in a limited area, detection 
of unknown  (or 0-day) attacks which are based on other attacks that are previ- 
ously known to the IDS. The AIS neatly interfaces with the problem domain by 
treating internal IDS data structures as an artificial tissue environment. Finally 
the algorithm was evaluated in terms of how accurately the novel variations can 
be identified. 
It should be noted that the results are not directly comparable  to other IDS 
algorithms as the problem  being solved is uniquely  circumscribed. Rather than 
designing an anomaly  detection algorithm to find previously  unknown  attacks, 
a misuse detector and  alert correlator are extended to detect a certain kind of 
anomaly  arising from the incomplete models that are invariably used with such 
algorithms. 
Initial results are promising despite the high false positive rate. However since 
the output is already  clustered (all packets which were in a given DC are linked 
together) it means that as long as there is an upper bound on false positives and 
the false negative rate is low, there will usually be an accurate detection among 
each such cluster. 
The  DCs in the presented model are able to detect specific anomalous  pat- 
terns of tissue growth and  identify where  and  when  novel  attacks are  taking 
place. After  a DC has made  an initial selection of candidate packets, it is then 
the responsibility of the T-cells to reduce the number  of packets still further by 
detecting structural similarities in the data. DCs are concerned  primarily  with 
detecting abnormal  behaviour  within their environmental context, whereas  T- 
cells are concerned  primarily  with discerning  patterns within the antigen data. 
The  co-ordination of both types of immune cell with each other and  the tissue 
through orthogonal programming interfaces make for neat and efficient solution. 
Further investigation in to the T-cell phase of the algorithm should be fruit- 
ful. The algorithm presented in this paper is fairly basic and does not incorporate 
meaningful  partial matching which is important for performance  and  accuracy. 
A tolerance mechanism  might also be useful in integrating the information con- 
veyed by the safe and  danger  signals to further  improve  the false positive rate 
in the difficult cases where malicious traffic differs only slightly from legitimate 
traffic. Future testing should  also  incorporate historically problematic attack 
variations in order to provide a more realistic appraisal of the algorithm. 
A mechanism  for the automated generation of signatures for the novel vari- 
ations discovered by the algorithm would be ideal. Work such as [17] shows us 
that this should, in theory, be possible with acceptable precision. 
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